The subtitle of the book is, “How the decline in marriage has increased inequality and lowered social mobility, and what we can do about it”.
Melissa Kearney is professor of economics at the University of Maryland. Her 2023 book The Two-Parent Privilege addresses the advantages to children of being raised in a family with both biological parents present – and, more specifically, the disadvantages to children being raised in single parent homes. She examines the causes of the hugely increased prevalence of single-mother families over the last 40 – 50 years. To do so she holds strictly to solid empirical data. With her background this mainly involves quantifiable “resources”, of which income is the most readily available. The data relates to the USA. However, the results will be broadly similar in the UK – with the exception of the race issues, which may be specific to the American context.
She identifies the main reason for the rise of single mother households being the decline of marriage rather than due to divorce (which, I note, is also true in the UK, see The Empathy Gap, section 13.3). Most single mothers were never married. Moreover she also emphasises that this decline of marriage is very strongly skewed to lower earners, which she aligns with those who do not have a four year college degree. This is again the same as in the UK (see The Empathy Gap, section 13.4). In the upper socioeconomic strata, marriage has declined only a little. The decline of marriage drives fatherlessness which in turn causes multiple disadvantages to their children see The Empathy Gap, chapter 14).
Kearney identifies the origin of the decline of marriage as being the falling relative earnings of non-college-educated men – relative, that is, both to the college educated (i.e., increasing inequality) and also relative to women in the same socioeconomic and educational category. This relative decline in male earnings results in such men being deemed less attractive as husbands by the corresponding women, even when they have a child together. The instability of unmarried cohabitation leads to single mother households even if this was not initially the case. In addition to those cases where the parents end up in conflict, and the father’s meaningful involvement with his child is frustrated by the mother, purely financial and logistical pressures also contribute to de facto fatherlessness.
The book describes how these factors, including the decline of marriage, are associated with increasing inequality and diminishing social mobility. (In my words, but not the author’s, feminism is the chief culprit here because feminism deliberately set out to destroy the two-parent family and so is responsible for all that follows in its wake). The book laments the vicious circle that arises as the reducing fortunes of boys from single parent homes then cause them to be less attractive “marriage material”, so that the situation is self-reinforcing in a form of positive feedback.
This situation is hardly a great deal for the single mothers, either, so men, women and children are all disadvantaged by these developments among the working class – and increasingly the lower reaches of the middle class. Again in my words, but not the author’s, feminism – as a product of middle-class women – is a tool of the elites: the relatively wealthy, college-educated, do well enough while the rest sink.
Despite the clear relationship which Kearney demonstrates between the decline of non-college-educated men’s earnings and the decline of marriage, and all that follows from that, the author also identifies evidence that these negative social effects will not now be reversed even if men’s earnings were to be revived. She obtained evidence for this irreversibility from specific local instances of improved working class men’s incomes, e.g., from towns with fracking booms, but these failed to be associated with an increased rate of marriage or a reduction in single motherhood. This she attributes to unidentified “social factors” which lie outside the reach of the data – and beyond the scope of issues she was willing to address.
She does, however, go on to discuss the reducing willingness of women to have children, especially when young. Undoubtedly this is a key contributory factor, though I wonder to what extent male reluctance is also involved. That fathers are routinely denied contact with their children by either belligerent mothers or hostile family courts is now well-known by young men and must surely influence their own willingness to father children.
Again I must observe (though the author does not) that it is feminism more than any other factor which has driven the career-first ethos among young women. It has also been feminism that has energetically, and successfully, steered the family courts and associated legislation in a direction which facilitates the eradication of fathers. Among the working class, and increasingly much of the middle class, these feminist-driven socioeconomic changes have been bad for men, women and children, and have resulted in increasing inequality. Unfortunately, there are still too many people, of both sexes, who have failed to understand this and still regard feminism as synonymous with all that is lovely.
Early on, Kearnery raises the question: “is it really the case that close to 40% of births in the US are to men who would not bring any positive resources (on net) into the home? Is it likely to be true that roughly 70% of births to non-college educate mothers are fathered by men with no positive resources to contribute to a family environment?” It is not clear to me that she ever answers this question. Perhaps in the context of earnings her answer is supposed to be implicit (and in the affirmative). But this is too limited an interpretation of “resources”. Kearney makes clear in her own life that the “resources” a father brings is more than just cash. She writes, “I have a lot of resources to draw on, including a spouse who is a devoted dad to our children and a partner to me”.
From that perspective the mothers’ judgment regarding the “marriageability” of the fathers is, one could argue, rather unenlightened. The mothers’ focus on financial issues alone, to the exclusion of “mere fatherhood”, carries some culpability – as does feminism, yet again, for promoting the empirical falsity that fathers are unnecessary and often undesirable.
Whilst Kearney proposes remedially measures which appear reasonable to a degree, the “social factors” which prevent reversibility of the “marriageable men hypothesis” now create the principle barrier against returning to children being raised overwhelmingly by both biological parents. And what the solution may be regarding eradication of these “social factor” barriers is not addressed and yet this is probably even more difficult than the financial issues. It is worth noting here that J.D.Unwin’s anthropological analysis unambiguously predicts that such situations are irreversible, leading to civilisational extinction.
Extracts from the book are as follows…
Disadvantage to children
“…a child born in a two-parent household with a family income of $50,000 has, on average, better outcomes than a child born in a single-parent household earning the same income.”
“…studies consistently indicate that children in stepfamilies tend to exhibit social and behavioural problems on a similar scale to children in single-parent homes, and more so than children living with continuously married biological parents.”
“Researchers found that family structure was a key determinant of the gender gap in behavioural outcomes, more so than early school environment…By eighth grade the gender gap in school suspension was close to 25% among children raised by single mothers, versus 10% among children from two biological parent families.”
“The absence of dads from many Black families disadvantages not only the children in those families but also the other boys growing up in the neighbourhood.”
Men’s Decline in Relative Earnings Drives Decline in Marriage, Increases in Divorce and Increases in Single Mother Families
Referring to the impact of China joining the WTO on the economies of manufacturing towns in the USA, specifically the degrading of working class men’s incomes, Kearney writes: “This external change – not to the types of men who live in a place, but to the economic reality of the place – allowed the economists to investigate statistically whether a change in men’s economic prospects can cause a change in marriage rates. The answer was yes.”
“Men without college degrees have seen their earnings stagnate and employment rates fall. Women, meanwhile, have experienced increases in average earnings regardless of their education level. This change has stripped many men of their traditional roles as breadwinner for the family and, in simple terms, made them less desirable marriage partners.”
“The study found that the decline in US manufacturing jobs led to a decrease in wages, a decrease in employment, a decrease in marriage rates, and an increase in wage inequality.” Kearney goes on to state that the effects also included increased single motherhood and increased poverty (for both black and white women).
“The decrease in men’s earnings relative to women’s earnings has also led to a reduction in marriage.” (my emphasis).
“…the earnings of wives tend not to exceed that of their husbands, and when they do, there is an increased incidence of divorce.”
Kearney observes that, as regards working class earnings, it is the intersection of being both Black and male that maximises the disadvantage, whilst being Black does not affect earnings or mobility rates for girls: “In tracing the Black-White gap in intergenerational mobility rates for girls the researchers found that it was generally non-existent: Black and White girls who grew up with the same levels of parental income experienced similar levels of earnings as adults…In a similar comparison of Black and White men raised in households with similar incomes the researchers found that Black men had substantially lower wages (and employment rates) than White men as they aged into adulthood.”
The Irreversibility of the Phenomenon: the “Social Factor”
“The ‘reverse marriageable men’ hypothesis, which predicted that improvements in the economic circumstances of men would lead to an increase in marriage and a reduction in the share of births outside marriage, was not what the data showed.”
Why? Kearney writes, “One possibility was (and is) that the social norms surrounding childbearing and marriage have changed enough that men and women didn’t feel the need to get married, or the desire to get married, even if the man had a well-paying job and the couple had a baby together.”
The author confirms that social norms do indeed influence marriage rates and single motherhood rates. “Wilson and I proceeded to examine whether the response to the sudden economic shock was different in places where nonmarital childbearing was more and less common. It was. In places where very few births occurred outside marriage before the start of fracking, the local fracking boom led to a sizeable increase in births only to married women, not to unmarried women. In places where a sizeable share of births occurred to unmarried women before the fracking boom, the economic boom led to relatively equal increases in births to unmarried and married women.”
As further confirmation that there is a social, and hence cultural, factor at work beyond the purely financial, Kearney observes, “Asian men with and without high school degrees experienced very small increases in median earnings over this 40-year period; yet they experienced relatively small declines in marriage.”
“While economic forces have been a key driver of the decline in marriage – and the corresponding increase in single-mother homes – it seems that we are now in a new social paradigm, where nonmarriage is common outside the college-educated class. This development has not been good for children.”
The author concludes, “…in a time when an increasing share of kids are born to unmarried parents, there may be no going back – at least not through economic changes alone.”
Women’s Attitudes to Birth And Fathers
Kearney includes a brief nod to what is actually the true nub of the problem: “They (the researchers) observed that some of the fathers in the programs had highly conflicted or disengaged relationships with their children’s mothers, and in some cases that mothers would serve as “gatekeepers”, restricting a father’s access to his child. The researchers suggested that programs may need to focus on helping parents improve their relationships with one another, whether amorous or not, in order to be able to help dads have more positive engagement with their children.” Easy to say.
The author includes a chapter on decreasing birth rates…
“Each (birth) decade stamped women with a different experience, and our study found that each successive cohort was less inclined toward having children – and not because of economic or policy factors that were in play at the time…Our analysis investigated the role of changes in public policies and economic conditions on changes in birth rates. Neither of those sets of explanations could explain much of the decline at all…It seems there has been an attitudinal shift away from the desire to become a mother at a young age, especially as a teen.”
“…the body of evidence led us to conclude that the source of decline in US births is likely something more fundamental – a set of shifts in priorities and experience across successive cohorts of young adults, as opposed to any readily identifiable economic or policy factor…”
Kearney’s Suggested Corrective Policies
“The conventional mores in the US today are to treat matters of family and family formation with a dedicated agnosticism, avowing any suggestion that one type of family might be somehow preferable to another family type.” This is the political denial that has been the norm for a least four decades.
“The decline in the two-parent family relates in part to the struggles of men, which is in turn contributing to the struggles of boys. This cycle is in desperate need of interruption: the US needs to raise boys who are fit to be reliable marriage partners and nurturing, supportive fathers…Helping children in this country will require helping dads.”
“Bolstering the well-being of children requires recognising the important role of fathers in children’s lives and boosting support to both mothers and fathers.”
In terms of policy, the author advises that we should “Start with an acknowledgement that in most cases, two-parent, stable families are very beneficial for children…we can and should explore ways to boost the prevalence of (healthy) two-parent families…At the same time, we can collectively work to strengthen alternative family structures, so that more children in families in which the parents do not live together have the benefit of positive support and engagement from two parents.” The latter provision aligns with the suggestion from Richard Reeves that (in my paraphrasing) we should accept that widespread parental separation is here to stay and concentrate upon bolstering greater involvement of fathers in their children’s lives after separation – essentially a default of equal shared care. Again, easy to say, but neither author has tackled the barriers in the way of that objective, not least half a century of legislation, vested interests and entrenched political and ideological opposition.
Kearney also cautions that we should not “Accept a new reality where the two-parent family is a thing of the past for less educated, lower-income Americans”.
“Increasing the share of children born to married parents and strengthening families will require improving the economic situation of many men in this country, especially those without a four-year college degree.” Unfortunately, the author has demonstrated that this, whilst necessary, is not sufficient. There appears to be changes in mindset which are not influenced by economic factors. It is not even clear whether it is the change in young women (towards careers rather than family) or the change in young men (away from fatherhood for fear of being subsequently rejected) which is the dominant factor.
“We need to foster a societal expectation that fathers be present in their children’s lives and support them financially and emotionally…it might mean revisiting fatherhood rights and child support enforcement regimes.” Yes, indeed, but it is far from clear how this can be achieved in the teeth of the widespread social, political and ideological factors which are opposed to it.
Dr Thomas Sowells work illuminated by Groan so accurately describes what has gone wrong, especially in urban areas and inner city estates. Melissa Kearney raises many questions but fails to answer all of them. I often find this among intellectuals in this field. I believe the fear of being ‘shamed/accused/ostracised’ by the entrenched feminists in this field is the reason why so few properly address the causes! Much easier to demonstrate the effects! There is huge revenue by myriad vested interests in child misery emanating from the ideologues and their brutal control over so much of this inter-generational tragedy.And once again lovely to read incisive analysis by young William Collins.
Young? Moi? I agree, though, it is the perennial fear to name the problem.
It’s very difficult to be in any way optimistic about the future for the west, given prevailing societal attitudes towards childbearing & rearing, which are intrinsically the gift of women. Even as stated above, the idea of civilisational extinction is proposed. Without Viktor Orban style of law & tax changes to promote childbirth, western countries are destined to die & even in Hungary the changes have only just managed to halt the decline, not reverse it. It would appear that western women have little or no desire to have children while in the earlier years of their lucrative careers, only really seriously considering children when the option starts turning into no option. On a ‘positive’ note, population numbers in the west will hold up, due to the more traditional/medieval views of the roles of women by Islam.
I believe that the cycle of life is upon us and there is no fix, never mind a ‘silver bullet’. So many Empires in the past have gone through a decline and homo sapiens has survived, hence we are simply in the last few generations of our age & we’ll make way for the new people.
As an aside, Fatherlessness is not a correct term – all children have fathers. Fatherless homes is better or as Warren Farrell says, Dad Deprived children.
Thanks, William for another great blog.
Quite right re “fatherlessness”, I must remember that.
The Economist Thomas Sowell looked closely at the development of fatherlessness in the “black” populations in the USA. ” Sowell explains that from 1940 to the 1960s, the poverty rate for Blacks dropped from 87 percent to 47 percent. Further, this economic progress occurred prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That legislation rightly guaranteed constitutional rights for Blacks, ended discriminatory practices in hiring, and prohibited segregation in public places. But as Sowell notes, in the decade of the 1960s, the federal government ushered in a suite of social welfare programs that in many respects worked to the detriment of Black populations.
Sowell tells Robinson that when looking back to the 1940s, the proportion of Black households led by a single parent was 17 percent. After these social welfare programs were enacted and took effect, that number quadrupled to 68 percent.”
He looked closely at this transformation over time and noted the combination of culture and how this interacted with the transformation in welfare under President Johnson onwards, where Black people were increasingly drawn into all sorts of programmes that were supposed to “help”. He notes the similarities with very poor “white” communities. Though not the focus of his investigation what one can see is that poor people are far more likely to be drawn into social engineering by “the state” because they become dependent on welfare and other “helps” that are designed to reflect the ideological goals of those in charge of the state. Thus there is a complex “dialectic” between cultural norms and aspirations and the operation of state programmes. For the better of “blacks” and indeed whites or other ethnic groups there is, as is the case in the UK, a huge difference between the % of fatherless families across socioeconomic strata. With the most “successful” racial or ethnic groups also showing very much lower % of fatherlessness etc. Why I mention this is because I think its often underestimated the extent and penetration of the state in poorer peoples lives. First of all there is the operation of the suite of benefits now grouped “universal credit” covering housing costs, fuel and food, “tax credits” topping up wages, free meals for children, child care. All of this is designed particularly to fund “single parent families” and adding up the benefits is equal to the “average household income” of a family not reliant on benefits (this is the “cap” recently introduced as previously it could rise to well above this). As you can imagine friends who worked in the enforcement side of the benefits agency saw that there was “industrial scale” fraud as women would claim there was no “partner” in the household when visited for a check, even though there was evidence of an adult male all over the place (and plenty of comical tales of “escapes” through back doors, hiding in sheds etc.). That this remains a norm that is rarely prosecuted is down to the sheer scale of the fraud and the fear of prosecuting what would be tens of thousand “mums”. As Sowell points out even in the US with less generous welfare still welfare recipients have cars, air con, TVs and broadband. Here this secure benefits income becomes the base income for a family with the “hidden” man contributing all the extras from what might actually be a good wage, but one that its less consistent or certain(think “contract work”, trades, industries that hire and fire easily, seasonal work. This in effect makes the mother the “breadwinner” and the father/s, or at least current partner provider of extras. Which is of course entirely in line with Hattie Harman’s 1970s policy of “the family” being “the mother and her children”. If you add in all sorts of other “benefits” from the state should you have/want to call on them up to such egregious items as free legal aid only if the woman claims domestic abuse: it should not surprise that “traditional” secure family formation is apparently almost the preserve of the well off and those with an aversion to dependency on benefits strong enough to eschew the handouts. While poorer groups in this country (Afro Caribbean “sink estate” whites) seem destined to follow the trajectory of poor blacks in the US.
My point being that the adoption of feminist inspired policies by the agents of government means that they have a huge influence on the lives of poor communities and this has spriralled in the way Sowell sets out happened in US black “neighbourhoods”. It doesn’t require the agents of the state to all be feminists themselves, for the effect of applying the programmes and their criteria does the work. Frequently it seems to be assumed the mayhem in man deserts is the result of a sort of wilful badness (especially in the males) yet in fact time after time surveys and research shows that just like their better off compatriots people aspire to grow up, find a partner form families and live a good life. The fact that this is not what happens seems to be treated as a total mystery. My “lived experience” after over 35 years in Social Care is that a very large part of this mystery is in the workings of the benefits and other state programmes that people have come to regard as “normal”.
Good article. I agree with much of it.
But it highlights that, amongst the working classes (in fact probably all classes STILL), men…
1 – are still only attractive as bread winners (main income providers) and
2 – are expected to be bread sharers (equity in the job market, in order to satisfy feminist dogma)
…both at the same time.
These are mutually exclusive goals and impossible to achieve together. One side has to go. But which?
In my view greater happiness for society overall comes from removing the former. Many men are clearly not happy being forced into a “this is your job in life, like it or not” lifestyle, and many women, as the article points out, are finding that expecting such bread winning men is no longer realistic in a post-feminist world. If we are being sold equality, then lets have it. It is (more or less) possible.
Part of the problem is the failure of feminism to improve men’s multi-lifestyle acceptability in line with that of women. They are stilll expected to be (and chosen as) bread winnders first and foremost.
If feminism, with all it’s financial backing and disproportionate influence, had focused on rectifying that issue earlier on (perhaps in place of obsessing over glass ceilings for 5% of the population, for example), society would (over the decades feminism has held sway) have become less inclined to expect the traditional “bread-winner” requirement from men and young women could have gradually had their priorities shifted to love rather than money as the attractor, especially if the state had offered assistance for MARRIED financial shortfall instead of that for single mothers.
But the feminists can’t see this.
Feminists have talked a lot about how men need to change, but very little about how their *circumstances* need to change. The problem discussed here is a result, in part, of that difference.
There is substantial evidence suggesting that the divide between male and female economic roles, where men on average earn more while women utilise the majority of disposable income, has elements of biological roots. This dynamic, which often combines with cultural aspects, is observed globally and persists even in societies historically considered matriarchal. It is also evident in some non-human mammals, particularly primates, where males often gather resources and females allocate them.
Statistical analyses reveal that women often choose roles prioritising flexibility, personal fulfilment, and lower stress—factors that correlate with lower average earnings. In the UK and USA, women are overrepresented in lower-paying fields like education, caregiving, and administrative work. In the UK 45% of professional roles are held by women but even so, women’s choices lead to them earning less. 75% of part-time employees in the UK are women. Most women, given the opportunity to earn without going to work, would do so. Most men, given the same opportunity, might change the work they do but would nevertheless seek to engage themselves in productive endeavour.
We can’t help be whom we are.
Studies further highlight that women influence 70–80% of household spending globally, including in the UK and USA. So although women earn on average 9% to 18% less than men (pick your data and you must include all ages, since the gender pay gap for the under 40s is negliginble or reversed).
The upshot is that while the average man earns around 54% compared to women’s average 46% of all earnings, men get to spend only about 23% compared to the women spending 77%. More than half of what men earn goes to women to spend.
There is no great evidence to show that this kind of disparity has not always existed, right back to the days of caveman. But whereas the contribution of a man once went to his woman directly and might have garnered some appreciation, now a great deal of the difference is engineered via the state, making the man seem expendable. And if the man is expendable, he is likely to be dispensed with.
I think the reality is best described by Melanie Philips in “Sex Change Society”. Where she describes feminism as being for “adolescents” and that feminists are “perpetual adolescents” in that they wish to remain protected from the choices and responsibilities of adults. Thus it is in built into feminism that men continue to have to be the “breadwinners” or at least the workers paying taxes because someone has to provide all the “support” that they constantly say women need. In effect requiring a continuing ” daddy “arrangement of selfless work from males without the need to engage in any reciprocation or relationship with the man/men busy supporting a sort of continuous teenage life. In a way positing women as a sort of aristocracy supported by the work of men (and some poor women) unencumbered by children, husbands or hard work. The vast majority of the taxes paid into welfare are paid by men. Understandably few feminists will countenance men men en masse similarly seeking to maintain their teenage into adulthood and eschew work for “choices”, “work life balance” and self discovery.